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Contemplating what Dwight Eisenhower could expect upon
entering the White House, outgoing President Harry Truman pre-
dicted: "He'll sit there ... and he'll say, 'Do this! Do that!' And
nothing will happen. Poor Ike-it won't be a bit like the Army.
He'll find it very frustrating."' I am reminded of that anecdote
whenever I encounter strong versions of the unitary executive argu-
ment. I thought of it frequently as I read the remarkable work of
self-styled unitarians Steven Calabresi and Christopher Yoo-both
the book-length manuscript embodying their several years of re-
search and the first installment that appears in this symposium.2
Truman's statement captures an important practical truth about
the presidency. The power to remove has limited real-world signifi-
cance,3 but it has generated an extraordinarily impassioned debate.
In this brief comment I want to explore the reasons for this
phenomenon. I will illustrate my point by reference to the seminal
case of Myers v. United States,4 which is not discussed in the
symposium contribution by Calabresi and Yoo-not surprising,
because that case was decided well after the period upon which
they focus here. After that, I will suggest some reasons why the
t Professor of Law and Political Science, Case Western Reserve University.
1. RIcHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER 9 (1960).
2. See Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the
First Half-Century, 47 CAsE W. RES. L. REV. 1451 (1997).
3. At least one other unitarian has recognized this point, although he draws different
inferences from it than I do. See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative
* State, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1231, 1244-45 (1994).
4. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
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removal power, despite its limited substantive importance, retains
its grip on the academic and political imagination.
I.
Frank Myers was appointed postmaster of Portland, Oregon,
for a four-year term by President Wilson in 1913.' Wilson reap-
pointed him to a second four-year term in 1917. The Senate rou-
tinely confirmed Myers both times. Following an investigation into
alleged irregularities at the Portland post office, the Postmaster
General demanded that Myers resign in January 1920.6 When
Myers refused, President Wilson summarily dismissed him. In
doing so, Wilson ignored the applicable statute, which had been on
the books for about half a century. That statute provided that local
postmasters like Myers "shall be appointed and may be removed
by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate."7 Myers protested his dismissal and ultimately filed suit to
recover the unpaid salary for the balance of his term. After he
died, his widow caried on the fight as administrator of his estate.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Taft, held
that the provision requiring Senate consent to removals was uncon-
stitutional. That provision was inconsistent with the idea of a uni-
tary executive and with the President's duties under the Take Care
Clause. To fulfill his constitutional responsibilities the President
needed aides whom he could trust implicitly to serve as his
surrogates and whom he could dismiss at will. On the way to this
sweeping conclusion, Taft also rejected the Tenure of Office Act,8
5. Except as otherwise noted, the facts are drawn from the transcript of the record in
Myers, which was published by the Government Printing Office. See POWER OF THE
PRESIDENT TO REMOVE FEDERAL OFFiCERS, S. Doc. No. 69-174, at 5-17 (1926).
6. The precise nature of the irregularities or the circumstances that prompted the
investigation are unclear. Chief Justice Rehnquist has referred to unspecified "irregularities
in the management of the Portland post office." WiLLIAM H. REHNQuiST, GRAND
INQUESTS 262 (1992). He recently observed that Myers was suspected of having "commit-
ted fraud in the course of his official duties" but provided no details concerning those
suspicions. Raines v. Byrd, 65 U.S.L.W. 4705, 4710 (U.S. June 26, 1997).
After finding no reference to this matter in any published works on President Wilson
or in his papers, I requested copies of material in the files of the Portland Oregonian.
Although the copies were mailed to me some weeks before the symposium, they never
arrived. The ghost of Frank Myers lives on.
7. Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 179, § 6, 19 Stat. 78, 80-81. This provision was carried
over from the Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 63, 17 Stat. 283, 292-93.
8. Ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430 (1867); see Myers, 272 U.S. at 176.
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which had been repealed nearly forty years earlier9 after having
been amended at the outset of the Grant administration to prevent
a repetition of the bitter conflict over removal of cabinet members
that had precipitated the impeachment of Andrew Johnson."
This dispute over a local postmaster seems like a small-
potatoes affair, hardly the stuff of great cases or grand consti-
tutional theory." So let's ask an apparently naive question: Why
is a statute requiring Senate consent to the removal of postmasters
troublesome? Put differently, how did this statute actually work?
The answer is that a chief executive who wanted to remove a
postmaster simply sent the name of a new nominee to the Senate;
confirmation of the successor amounted to consent to the removal
of the incumbent. President Wilson surely could have chosen that
course to get rid of Myers but, for whatever reason, he decided to
defy the statute and risk a constitutional confrontation. 2
What is more interesting about this case is not Wilson's
position but Taft's. Taft, you will recall, is the only person ever to
sit on the Supreme Court after having served as President, a fact
that is often invoked to explain the breadth of his Myers opinion.
But this fact raises another, largely overlooked, question: What was
President Taft's position on the statute that Chief Justice Taft
found so obnoxious?
It turns out that President Taft scrupulously complied with the
statute-about two hundred times during his four years in office.'3
As far as I have been able to determine, he never objected to the
requirement of senatorial consent to the removal of postmasters.
When the Senate failed to act the first time he proposed to dismiss
a postmaster, Taft routinely resubmitted the name of his preferred
alternative. 4 Nor did Taft protest when the Senate three times
9. See Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 353, 24 Stat. 500.
10. See Act of Apr. 5, 1869, cl. 10, 16 Stat. 6. See generally Jonathan L. Entin, The
Removal Power and the Federal Deficit: Form, Substance, and Administrative Indepen-
dence, 75 KY. LJ. 699, 722-24 (1987).
11. It is clear, however, that Myers was regarded as a momentous case even before it
was decided. It was argued twice in the Supreme Court; on reargument Senator George
Wharton Pepper, appearing by invitation of the Court, presented the views of Congress.
12. Why Wilson chose this strategy is beyond the scope of this essay. For speculation
on the question, see Entin, supra note 10, at 731-32.
13. See, e.g., 48 CONG. REC. 9239 (1912) (seeking consent to remove and replace
postmasters in Illinois, Kentucky, and Minnesota); 45 CONG. REc. 62 (1909) (seeking
consent to remove and replace postmasters in Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
and West Virginia).
14. See, e.g., 48 CONG. REc. 86 (1911) (resubmitting name of James S. Byrd to be
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refused to go along with his proposal to oust John G. Gorth as
postmaster of Oconomowoc, Wisconsin, and replace him with W.A.
Jones. 5
Now, Taft's failure to object to the statute while he was in
the White House does not mean that either the postmaster statute
or the Tenure of Office Act was constitutional. But the unitary
executive argument goes well beyond situations like these, which
are not especially controversial.'6 True unitarians believe, with
Chief Justice Taft, that any restriction on the President's absolute
power to remove nonjudicial officers violates the constitutional
design. Even laws that allow the chief executive to remove
officials without senatorial consent are unacceptable if those laws
limit the grounds for removal. The ease with which the President
could accomplish his will under the postmaster statute counsels
some hesitancy before we characterize that statute-or more modest
restrictions on the removal power such as the for-cause
requirements upheld in Humphrey's Executor v. United States7
and Morrison v. Olson' 5-as heralding the demise of "our former
constitutional system. ' ' 9
The institutional arrangements embodied in the postmaster
statute bear important resemblances to practices that are widely
accepted. Suppose a President unilaterally removes an official-a
cabinet secretary, let's say, to keep the discussion focused on a
high-level position in the executive branch-and designates a
successor who must be confirmed by the Senate. Nothing in the
Constitution prevents the Senate from rejecting the new nominee
for whatever reason, including opposition to the President's
exercise of the removal power. The Senate cannot undo the firing,
but it can strongly influence the kind of successor the President
could choose.2'
postmaster of Jonesboro, Tennessee, after Senate previously adjourned without voting on
Byrd's nomination to replace incumbent postmaster Frank E. Britton).
15. The Senate never voted on the removal of Gorth and his replacement by Jones.
See 46 CONG. REC. 73 (1910); 47 CONG. REc. 54 (1911); 48 CONG. REC. 87 (1911).
16. Although Justice Brandeis dissented in Myers (as did Justices Holmes and
McReynolds), his disagreement rested on the view that a local postmaster was really an
inferior officer. See Myers, 272 U.S. at 240-95 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also
Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Separation of Powers and Administrative Law: Delegation, the
Legislative Veto, and the "Independent" Agencies, 75 Nw. U. L. REv. 1064, 1105 (1981).
17. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
18. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
19. Id. at 715 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
20. Consider the reaction to President Nixon's dismissal of Archibald Cox as the
1598 [Vol. 47:1595
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There is nothing wrong with that as a matter of constitutional
principle. The Appointments Clause, after all, requires that the
Senate give its advice and consent to the selection of such
officials. Indeed, we have several recent examples of cabinet
nominations foundering on the shoals of the Senate confirmation
process: John Tower was rejected as President Bush's secretary of
defense, and several of President Clinton's nominees-including his
first two choices for attorney general (Zoe Baird and Kimba Wood)
and more recently his candidate for director of the CIA (Anthony
Lake)-withdrew in the face of concerted senatorial opposition.
The Constitution's explicit limitation on the President's
appointment power suggests that we should be reluctant to embrace
the unitarian view of the removal power. If the chief executive
cannot unilaterally select the team that will implement his policies,
why infer-in the face of textual silence-that he must have unfet-
tered discretion to fire?2'
Moreover, Congress has other ways to intrude into executive
branch personnel matters over the President's objection. For
example, it could abolish an agency or department altogether to
force the ouster of someone who had aroused legislative ire.
Alternatively, Congress could cut the salary, reduce the staff, or
otherwise disimprove the working conditions for such a person. Or
Congress could move the person's office to an unattractive location
to force a resignation. Finally, Congress could hound someone out
of office through extensive investigations or oversight hearings.
Most of these options might seem unlikely to occur in the real
world, '  but it is generally accepted that nothing in the
Constitution prevents the legislative branch from taking any of
those actions even though they might significantly restrict the
Watergate special prosecutor. In order to secure Senate confirmation of a replacement for
Attorney General Eliot Richardson, who had resigned over the Cox dismissal, the
President had to acquiesce in the appointment of a new special prosecutor who had
greater guarantees of job security than Cox had. See ELIZABETH DREW, WASHINGTON
JoURNAL 91 (1975); STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE 426 (1990).
21. There might be historical evidence suggesting that the framers intended a limited
check on presidential personnel policies, embodied in the confirmation requirement. I have
not examined the background evidence on the Appointments Clause and do not intend by
raising the question in text to add to the historical debate between Professors Calabresi
and Flaherty that is renewed in this symposium.
22. The relocation scenario is not, however, entirely hypothetical. The headquarters of
the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health were moved from Washington to
Atlanta to accommodate the wishes of the agency's newly appointed director. See WASH.
POST, Jan. 14, 1983, at A13.
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President's ability to implement his policies with personnel of his
own choosing.
Finally, unitarians contend that the chief executive must have
unfettered removal power as "the 'gun behind the door' to "bend
his 'team' to his will."23 Whatever might be said for this propo-
sition in theory, it is dubious as an empirical matter. Presidents
rarely fire anybody, and not only because everyone in the
executive branch is loyal to every aspect of administration policies.
There are genuine costs to firing people who might have built a
devoted following in the country or who have some kind of
political leverage of their own.24 For example, what chief execu-
tive could have dismissed J. Edgar Hoover as FBI director?' And
consider the national uproar that followed President Nixon's
sacking of Archibald Cox, which fueled suspicions that Nixon had
something serious to hide and thereby undermined his ability to
remain in office.' Instead, chief executives use a variety of less
formal but more effective mechanisms to maintain their
leadership.27
In other words, the unitarian theory of the removal power is
unpersuasive if the argument is assessed in terms of the real
significance of that power. But the vigor with which the unitarian
theory is advanced implies that the argument must be about some-
thing else.
II.
At one level, the debate over removal is symbolic. It is about
who has power, influence, and strength-and who doesn't. No
President wants to look like he can be "rolled." Perhaps this is
simply an inelegant modem formulation of Madison's observation
that the chief executive possesses "the necessary constitutional
means and personal motives" to resist encroachments by the other
branches as part of a constitutional scheme under which
"[a]mbition [is] made to counteract ambition."'  Thus,
23. CLINTON RossrTER, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 20 (2d ed. 1960).
24. See, e.g., WILLIAM L. CARY, POLITICS AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES 10 (1967).
25. Some considered the idea but decided that the political risks were too great. See
RICHARD GID POWERS, SECRECY AND POWER 353, 357, 396, 488-89 (1987).
26. See DREW, supra note 20, at 112-13, 115-16, 148-49; KUTLER, supra note 20, at
406, 410-14, 619.
27. See Entin, supra note 10, at 779-80.
28. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321-22 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961).
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notwithstanding Taft's acquiescence in the postmaster statute,
Presidents can be expected to assert their authority over the
executive branch. Similarly, the ebbs and flows of relative
interbranch power are reflected in other innovations. For example,
approximately eighty percent of the more than two hundred bills
containing legislative vetoes-the subject of another great legal,
political, and academic debate until the Supreme Court purported to
settle the question in INS v. Chadha29-were enacted between
1970 and 1976, a period when presidents were unusually weak
politically. °
The removal argument has largely unfolded as part of the
continuing reassessment of the place of so-called independent
agencies. All recent chief executives have sought to increase the
extent of policy coordination among federal administrative
agencies. The extent to which theses initiatives may be applied
to independent agencies remains unresolved. Independent agencies
are often regarded as somewhat less susceptible to direct presi-
dential control than are executive branch agencies, which tend to
be seen as more clearly within the White House's domain.32 The
absence of controlling judicial precedent has made it necessary for
analysts and advocates to rely upon the Supreme Court's removal
jurisprudence-Myers involved a postmaster, an executive branch
official; Humphrey's Executor concerned the head of the Federal
Trade Commission, one of the classic examples of an independent
agency-for whatever guidance those cases might offer.
That the removal debate has become a symbol of the struggle
between Congress and the President for control over policy-making
suggests that the debate is really about the role of government in
American society. Proponents of the unitarian vision of the
presidency tend to favor limited government, or at least a limited
29. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). In fact, Congress has continued to enact analogous provisions
in appropriations bills, where for various reasons it is difficult to raise meaningful
political or legal challenges. See Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It
Survives, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1993, at 273. But see JESSICA KORN, THE
POWER OF SEPARATION 39-40 (1996) (arguing that these provisions are not really
legislative vetoes).
30. See NELSON W. POLSBY, CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENCY 237 n.122 (4th ed.
1986).
31. See, e.g., PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE'S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
215-25 (9th ed. 1995); STEPHEN G. BREYER Er AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
REGULATORY POLICY 5-25 (3d ed. Supp. 1996).
32. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SuP. CT. REv. 41, 63-64
(1986).
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federal government.33 They believe that a strong defense of
presidential prerogative-giving the chief executive unfettered
removal authority, for example-would make Congress less willing
to empower agencies from which the legislative branch is effec-
tively insulated. This approach is part of a larger program of
maintaining clear interbranch boundaries that would make it more
difficult for the federal government to take on new responsibilities.
Indeed, the blurring of the legislative-executive line in independent
agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission and the recently
abolished Interstate Commerce Commission suggests that at least
some widely heralded innovations are more likely to arise when
interbranch boundaries are less distinct than the unitarians prefer. 4
Not all advocates of a strong presidency oppose federal
initiatives, however. Several of the leading separation of powers
cases during the past two decades were brought by proponents of a
more vigorous federal government. These activists believe that
strict adherence to separation of powers principles will reduce the
influence of special interests and enhance the prospects for more
effective protections for public health, the environment, workers,
and consumers.35
It is not my purpose here to evaluate which of these visions is
more accurate. Whether rigorous adherence to the unitary executive
theory will limit or reduce the role of the federal government is
for more sophisticated analysts. One of those analysts, Professor
Lowi, suggests elsewhere in this symposium that neither view is
correct and that we have recently seen the emergence of an
institutionalized dual-party government that is incapable of making
substantive decisions of any kind.36  My point is that the
arguments about the removal power are really about what the
federal government should be doing. I think we should talk about
that very important question directly and not obscure the issue
33. But cf Robert F. Nagel, The Future of Federalism, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv.
643, 659 (1996) (suggesting that many contemporary opponents of strong federal
government also dislike government at all levels); Mark Tushnet, Living in a
Constitutional Moment? Lopez and Constitutional Theory, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 845,
869 (1996) (noting the possibility that governmental power may be evaporating rather than
devolving).
34. See Jonathan L. Entin, Congress, the President, and the Separation of Powers:
Rethinking the Value of Litigation, 43 ADMtN. L. REv. 31, 49-50 (1991).
35. See id. at 51-52.
36. See Theodore J. Lowi, President v. Congress: What the Two-Party Duopoly Has
Done to the American Separation of Powers, 47 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1219 (1997).
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behind a facade of rhetoric about a relatively unimportant question
that most Americans (and many lawyers) do not understand or care
about.
By now it should be clear that I am skeptical about many of
the unitarians' underlying premises. But despite my skepticism, I
believe that Calabresi and Yoo have performed a valuable service
with their prodigious research. They have brought together a mas-
sive amount of information about every President's approach to
removal and superintendence of executive authority in a format that
will facilitate future research and discussion. Their interpretations
are bound to provoke disagreement,37 but no one should underesti-
mate the great service they have performed for those of us who
care about the presidency and about our country.
37. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, Relearning Founding Lessons: The Removal Power
and Joint Accountability, 47 CASE W. RES. L. RFV. 1563 (1997).
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